We analyze asymmetric information in private long-term disability insurance. With a unique dataset including both group and individual insurance, we are able to disentangle moral hazard and selection in individual insurance by using group insurance as a control group. Our results provide evidence of moral hazard in the group insurance market and of moral hazard and advantageous selection in individual insurance market. Furthermore, we can identify residential location as one source of advantageous selection.
Introduction
Disability and its consequent loss of income constitute a significant risk for lifetime income.
The greatest asset of (not only young) adults is oftentimes their human capital, i.e., their participation in the workforce over their lifetime. In 2011, the average lifetime earnings of a high school graduate in the U.S. was $1.3 million, while for employees holding a doctorate degree, this value was $3.5 million (United States Census, 2011) . In case of a severe disability, individuals must forgo a large share of this income, as they are no longer able to work. The probability of becoming disabled is not negligible. A 20 year old worker in the U.S. has a 30% chance of being forced to stop working for longer than six months due to a disability during his work life (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2011).
Most Western countries thus provide some type of governmental social security in case of disability. 1 The U.S., for example, provide Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Disability payments in the U.K. are part of National Insurance, and in Germany, the so-called Erwerbsminderungsrente is part of the German statutory pension insurance scheme. However, this social insurance often provides only the bare minimum of what is needed to compensate for lost income. Therefore, it would be rational for risk-averse agents to purchase additional insurance coverage in the private insurance market. This can be done through an employer-provided group contract or individual insurance. Nevertheless, the market penetration of private long-term disability insurance is rather low. In the US, 68% of the private sector workforce did not have private long-term disability insurance in 2014 (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2014). Similar observations can be made in other countries. In the German market, from which the data analyzed in this research project are drawn, approximately 69% of persons between 25 and 64 years old did not have private coverage against the risk of disability in 2014. 2 This raises the question whether there are systematic obstacles to higher market penetration given the substantial disability risk exposure of individuals. One explanation could be market failure due to asymmetric information. Several authors have shown that moral hazard is a problem in disability insurance. In the U.S., Autor and Duggan (2003) show that governmental social insurance plan generosity impacts the labor force exit propensity of high school dropouts.
At the same time, stricter screening for these plans was shown to reduce both long-term absenteeism due to disability and new applications for disability insurance in the Netherlands (de Jong et al., 2011) . In employer-provided group insurance, Butler et al. (1996) find an increase in the proportion of soft tissue injuries in worker's compensation, which can mostly be explained by moral hazard. Furthermore, Autor et al. (2014) find that different plan parameters, such as the elimination period, influence the likelihood of filing a disability claim.
While moral hazard is well documented, selection effects have thus far not been analyzed in the disability insurance market. 3 There is evidence that private information regarding a disability exists (Hendren, 2013) . Furthermore, we know that private information leads to selection effects in other insurance markets (see Cohen and Siegelman (2010) for a detailed overview).
However, these results cannot simply be transferred to disability insurance, as the findings depend strongly on the specific type of insurance. In automobile insurance, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) found no evidence of asymmetric information, while Cohen (2005) and Spindler et al. (2013) found adverse selection. The results for the health insurance market are even more diverging. Again, several studies showed adverse selection (Cutler and Reber, 1998; Browne, 1992) . On the contrary, Fang et al. (2008) and Bauer et al. (2015) observed advantageous selection. The results for the annuity market are rather clear, as the majority of studies found adverse selection (see, e.g., Poterba, 2002, 2004; McCarthy and Mitchell, 2010) . In long-term care insurance, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) as well as Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014) showed that adverse and advantageous selection exist at the same time.
The reason why disability insurance has not yet been analyzed regarding selection effects could be the difficulty of disentangling moral hazard and selection effects. Typical approaches such as the utilization of dynamic properties (Abbring et al., 2003a,b ) (e.g., in the form of a "bonusmalus" system) or interactions of the coverage-risk correlation with policyholder characteristics (Cohen, 2005) are not possible in disability insurance or are difficult to conduct due to the low probability of becoming disabled, respectively.
We aim to fill this gap by analyzing both moral hazard and selection effects in private longterm disability insurance. In our analysis, we use a unique dataset from a large German life insurance company, covering the period 2000 to 2012. We look at disability insurance sold both in employer provided group insurance and private individual insurance. The group market has already been analyzed regarding moral hazard (Autor et al., 2014) . We thus follow Autor et al. (2014) and use the so called elimination period as a measure of coverage. However, our paper is the first that also considers the individual market, where selection effects are possible due to the individual choice of coverage. Analyzing the two markets separately, we find a positive correlation between risk and coverage in both markets, which is evidence of asymmetric information. Analyzing both markets jointly enables us to disentangle moral hazard and selection effects by using the group insurance as a control for moral hazard. This argumentation has been used successfully in several studies to disentangle moral hazard and selection (e.g., Browne, 1992) . In the joint estimation, our results provide evidence of moral hazard both in individual and in group insurance, and of advantageous selection in individual insurance. Additionally, we can identify residential location as one source of advantageous selection in individual insurance.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section provides an overview of the dataset. In the third section, we generally discuss asymmetric information in disability insurance and derive implications for our dataset. After some preliminary evidence of asymmetric information in Section 4, we disentangle moral hazard and selection effects in Section 5. Section 6 presents an illustrative example for advantageous selection. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
The Data
The product we look at is standard private long-term occupational disability insurance. Individuals can buy this product to insure their ability to work. Once individuals are no longer able to work in their current occupation, e.g., due to back pain or psychological problems, disability can be claimed. To be exact, an individual is classified as disabled if he is no longer able to work more than a predefined threshold, typically 50% of the contractually agreed upon working hours, for more than six months. From then on, the insurance company makes monthly payments until the end of the disability, maturity, or death, whichever comes first. 4 If a so-called elimination period is agreed on, these payments begin after the elimination period. There is no universal definition of disability in this type of product. Allowance always depends on certification by a 4 Typical age at maturity for these products is the statutory retirement age, ranging between 65 and 67. million contract-year observations. All contracts we observe were actually signed in this period,
i.e., we can observe the entire contract history for each contract. Left truncation is therefore not a problem in our dataset. The unit of observation is the contract and includes information about contract characteristics, such as the elimination period and the sum insured; demographic characteristics, such as age or gender; and information about disability, such as insurance claims. Table 1 provides an overview of all the variables used in the analysis.
The product is sold as private individual insurance and employer-provided group insurance.
These two versions mainly differ with regard to two aspects. First, the biggest difference is the policyholder. In group insurance, the employer is the policyholder and buys mandatory insurance for his employees as insured persons. Consequently, choices, such as duration, payment terms and, most importantly, coverage, are determined by the employer and not the individual. They are specified in a group contract that is the same for all the employees of the respective employer.
If an individual is hired by the employer, it is mandatory to join the group contract as a part of the corporate pension scheme. In individual insurance, all these choices are up to the individual.
Second, the pricing also differs slightly. While the premium for individual insurance depends on the actual occupation and detailed medical history of the insured, this is not always the case in group insurance. Medical history is still observed, however, the questions are less detailed. The occupation in group insurance is determined at a group level, i.e., represents only the average risk of the respective group. Still, it is not uncommon that one employer defines separate groups within one group contract, e.g., for blue-collar and white-collar workers.
If a person is insured in group or individual insurance depends on the employer. If the employer provides such coverage, it is mandatory for every employee. Otherwise, coverage has to be purchased on the individual market. It has been shown in employer provided health insurance in the US that such employer provided insurance might influence the selection into jobs. Individuals in poorer health might sort into jobs with health insurance coverage, because they can not purchase or afford coverage on the individual market (e.g., Bundorf et al., 2010) .
However, the situation for employer provided disability insurance is different. The premium also depends on the individuals' medical and psychological history, as in individual insurance.
Medical history might also be an exclusion criterion from the group coverage, as in individual insurance. Therefore, nothing is to be gained from group insurance in this regard.
Our dataset contains the unique combination of nearly identical disability insurance products, sold in group and individual insurance. As described above, these two ways differ with respect to the ability of the insured person to choose the coverage against the risk of a disability. The situation therefore represents a natural experiment with regard to selection effects, as discussed in the next section in more detail.
We analyze asymmetric information by measuring the correlation between risk and coverage.
Therefore, we follow Autor et al. (2014) and take the elimination period as our measure of coverage. The elimination period can be considered a deductible, as the disability payments begin after this period. During the elimination period, the individual is not allowed/able to work due to his disability, and, therefore, receives no salary. 6 The elimination period must not be mistaken as a waiting period. Some insurance products do not provide compensation for claims that occur in the first weeks or months. This period is sometimes called waiting period.
The product described in our analysis does not include such an instrument, only the elimination period described above. The individual is covered against the risk of a disability from day one on. However, if a disability occurs, at some point in time, the elimination period begins. If it is zero, disability payments start immediately. If an elimination period of, e.g., 6 months is agreed, these payments begin 6 months after the occurrence of the disability. Living costs during the elimination period must therefore be paid out of pocket, which is why the duration of the elimination period is an adequate measure of coverage. Autor et al. (2014) already showed that a shorter elimination period, i.e., higher coverage, is associated with a higher likelihood of a claim in group disability insurance. As discussed in Section 3, this is evidence of moral hazard. The table reports the number of contracts observed with the respective duration of the elimination period, for both individual and group insurance.
As previously mentioned, the elimination period is chosen by the employer in group insurance and by the individual in individual insurance. Elimination periods can last 0 months, i.e., no elimination period, 3 months or 6 months. Table 2 summarizes the agreed duration of the elimination period for both individual and group insurance. In individual insurance, the typical trade-off between a lower premium and higher coverage determines the choice of the individual. As shown in Table 2 , higher coverage seems to be more important in individual insurance. In contrast, in group insurance, the employer selects the duration. Considerations here are on the one hand, complete coverage for the employees, and on the other hand, higher disability payments. These payments are mainly determined by the premium, which is fixed as a percentage of the salary, but also depend on the coverage and are therefore, ceteris paribus, higher with a longer elimination period. This might explain why group insurance more frequently selects 6-month elimination periods. Of course, employers also might not want to increase their employees' incentives to become disabled due to a short elimination period (Autor et al., 2014) .
Types of Asymmetric Information in Disability Insurance
Next we want to hypothesize which types of asymmetric information can occur in disability insurance and, thus, in our data. Before doing so, it is useful to look at the proportion of different reasons for a disability in Table 3 . 7 We now discuss how a disability and the different reasons behind it could be affcted by asymmetric information. The numbers are based on all disabilities claimed in the German market in 2013.
Generally, two types of asymmetric information exist: Moral hazard on the one hand, and selection effects on the other, while the latter can be subdivided into adverse selection and advantageous selection.
Moral hazard can also be divided into subcategories. One such type is ex ante moral hazard, which describes a change in the precaution of the insured due to insurance (Holmström, 1979; Shavell, 1979) . In the case of disability insurance, less prevention could eventually result in a higher probability of disability. In the health insurance market, it is often argued that ex ante moral hazard plays a minor role, as insurance coverage cannot compensate for the far-reaching consequences of health loss (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Kenkel, 2000) . Although some studies found contradicting results (Klick and Stratmann, 2007; Dave and Kaestner, 2009) , the empirical evidence mostly supports this reasoning (e.g., Newhouse, 1993; Courbage and Coulon, 2004) .
As in health insurance, it is unlikely that ex ante moral hazard is large in disability insurance.
It does not seem plausible that people would start smoking or skydiving because their ability to work is insured should they develop cancer or suffer paraplegia, respectively. Furthermore, many reasons for disability, such as mental disorders, are hardly influenced by prevention. Still, it must be noted that Kaestner and Carroll (1997) showed a decrease in precaution, and, therefore, an increase in accidents due to higher workers' compensation benefits.
In the context of disability insurance, ex post moral hazard, which describes an insuranceinduced change in loss claiming behavior or in the incentives to keep the costs of a loss low (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968) , seems more important. This would mean that individuals with a disability that is not too severe will claim disability if they have insurance, while continuing to work if they had no insurance. One example for this could be light back problems, which do not necessarily prevent somebody to work. Still, they could easily be exaggerated when claiming disability, as they are hard to verify. Autor et al. (2014) show that different coverage in the form of different elimination periods influences the likelihood of a claim in group disability insurance.
They describe this behavior as forward looking moral hazard 8 . This means that the "choice" to become disabled depends on the agreed upon coverage, as it influences the cash flow received through this course of action.
In our dataset, moral hazard plays a role both in group and in individual insurance. In both markets, the likelihood of a claim might be influenced by coverage in form of an elimination period. The insurance company does not cover payments during the elimination period. A longer elimination period, i.e., lower coverage, might therefore be an incentive not to become disabled. Moral hazard in the analyzed dataset would result in a positive correlation between risk and coverage.
The concept of adverse selection in insurance markets was introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and has since been further developed in many different theoretical models (e.g., Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; Spence, 1978) . They all share the idea that heterogeneous insureds have more information about their risk type than the insurer. This means individuals are aware of their risk type, while the insurer cannot differentiate among them, i.e., cannot charge higher premiums for high-risk individuals. This results in high-risk individuals purchasing more insurance coverage than low-risk individuals. In the case of disability insurance, this would mean that the reduction in the premium due to the deductible, i.e., the elimination period, is the same for high-and low-risk individuals. However, individuals know their risk type and thus high-risk individuals buy more coverage than their low-risk counterparts as this option is relatively cheaper for them. This could be the case in the dataset if individuals had additional knowledge about their risk type that is not requested during the application process. An example for this would be information resulting from a predictive genetic test. This could give individuals precise information about their propensity, e.g., to get cancer. This information must not be used by the insurer and was shown to lead to adverse selection, e.g., in the long-term care insurance market (Ostera et al., 2010) . Another source of information could be diseases in the family history. In such cases, high-risk individuals would choose shorter elimination periods, i.e., higher coverage. This would result in a positive correlation between risk and coverage. However, for adverse selection, it is necessary that individuals have the endogenous choice of coverage at inception. In the dataset, this is only the case in individual insurance. In group insurance, the elimination period is determined by the employer, and it is the same for every individual in the respective group contract. Adverse selection is thus not possible in group insurance in our dataset. This argumentation is common for group insurance markets; see, e.g., Breyer et al.
(2012) for a discussion in the health insurance market. It has been successfully applied in several studies to disentangle moral hazard and adverse selection; see, e.g., Browne (1992) .
While adverse selection leads to a positive coverage-risk correlation, advantageous selection leads to the exact opposite result, i.e., a negative correlation between risk and coverage. In cases of advantageous selection, individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion buy more coverage, but entail a lower risk (Hemenway, 1990; de Meza and Webb, 2001) . Suggestive examples given by Hemenway (1990) include motorcyclists without helmets who are more likely to be uninsured and drivers of rental cars who do not wear seat belts who are less likely to purchase insurance. In both cases, the higher-risk individuals (no helmet or no seatbelt) buy less insurance. For disability insurance, this would mean that risk averse individuals choose shorter elimination periods, i.e., higher coverage, because they do not want to bear the risk of being without income for too long. Additionally, these risk averse individuals would have a lower probability of becoming disabled. It can easily be imagined that risk averse individuals could be at lower risk of disability, e.g., due to a more cautious lifestyle. They are less likely to start a dangerous hobby or to engage in risky behavior such as smoking or drinking (Barsky et al., 1997) . As for adverse selection, advantageous selection requires the endogenous choice of coverage at inception. This is only the case for individual insurance in our dataset.
Preliminary Evidence of Asymmetric Information
To examine the relationship between coverage and claims, i.e., elimination period and disability, we first take a separate look at the group and individual market. We use a bivariate probit estimation, which was first used by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) to estimate the correlation between claims and coverage and has since then become one of the standard approaches when analyzing asymmetric information in insurance markets.
Note that censoring of claims due to a deductible is not a problem in our dataset. This issue, sometimes referred to as "accidents versus claims" in studies of asymmetric information, could cause a positive correlation of claims and coverage, independent of asymmetric information. The correlation can be caused by small losses which are only reported as a claim if the deductible is low enough (Chiappori and Salanié, 2013) . Due to the definition of disability in the general conditions of insurance of the product, we do not have this problem here. The policy conditions define disability as being unable to work for more than six months, which is at the same time the longest possible elimination period. 9 Without this time threshold, a five months absenteeism would be a claim for no elimination period contracts, but no claim for contracts with a 6 months elimination period. Therefore, there would naturally be a positive risk coverage correlation, independent of asymmetric information. However, in our case absenteeisms under six months are never a claim, independent of the elimination period, and are always a claim if they last longer than six months.
The bivariate probit model we use is a joint model for two binary dependent outcomes.
The two binary dependent variables in our case are the claims disability i , i.e, the realization of disability, and the coverage highcoverage i , i.e., the choice of the elimination period.
The first variable is binary by nature; disability i is 1 for contracts with a disability claim, and 0 otherwise. For the choice of coverage, we define high coverage, i.e., highcoverage i is 1, as an elimination period below a certain threshold. We will use both 3 and 6 months as thresholds to check the robustness of our results. X i is the set of exogenous variables for individual i that 9 One rare exception would be a case where a physician certifies a disability with a duration longer than six month in advance, and the insured person recovers faster (in under six months) unforeseenly. In such cases, the benefits paid out are not reclaimed by the insurer. In our analysis, we do not count such cases, which account for approximately 2% of all claims, as a disability.
is used by the insurance company to assess the individuals' risk of a disability. In the bivariate probit model, the error terms 1 and 2 are distributed as bivariate normal, with correlation ρ, that is, (
We test if ρ = 0. If this is the case, there is no correlation between high coverage and disability, i.e., no asymmetric information. In contrast, a correlation between claims and coverage provides evidence of asymmetric information. In such a case, coverage and the risk of a disability are related in a way that goes beyond the risk categorization of the insurance company. We estimate ρ separately for the group and the individual market, the results are presented in Table   4 . The table reports estimated correlation between the error terms, both in group and individual insurance. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
In the group market, we find a positive and significant correlation between claims and coverage, for both specifications of high coverage. As described earlier, there are no selection effects possible in the group market. Therefore the correlation is evidence of moral hazard, which confirms the results of Autor et al. (2014) .
In the individual market, the correlation is also positive and significant, independent of the specification of high coverage. However, when looking at the magnitude of the correlation, the effect is not as strong as in the group market. This preliminary evidence suggests that a selection effect in the individual market might offset the moral hazard effect. To give a clearer picture of this interrelationship, we will disentangle moral hazard and selection effects in the individual market in the next subsection.
Disentangling Moral Hazard and Selection Effects
We now estimate moral hazard in the group market and moral hazard and selection effects in the individual market in one model. As in Section 4, highcoverage i is our dependent variable. 10 Different from Section 4, we include the realized disability claims in form of the variable disability i , which is 1 if the policyholder claimed disability, and 0 otherwise, as a dependent variable. Thus, we analyze if the chosen coverage can be explained by the realized disability claims. This would be evidence of asymmetric information. Our estimation strategy looks as follows:
The variableP i is the predicted probability of becoming disabled, and is included to control for nonlinearities (Dionne et al., 2001 ). Prior to the probit estimation described in (2), a probit estimation with disability claims as a dependent variable and the variables used by the insurance company to asses the risk of a disability as independent variables is run. In the interest of brevity, we do not display the results. They show sensible patterns, e.g., positive coefficients of the medical and the hobby surcharge. After this, the predicted disability probabilityP i for every individual is calculated and included as an independent variable in the probit estimation described in (2). Again, X i is a rowvector that includes information used by the insurance company to asses the risk of a disability. Additionally, we run the probit estimation
The difference to estimation (2) is the inclusion of the row vector C i , which includes additional information about payment arrangements or the year of contract signing. These are observed by the insurance company, but are not used to assess the risk of a disability.
As described above, the variable disability i shows if the insured person in the respective contract claimed disability. The variable individual i indicates if the contract is a group or an individual contract. Therefore, the interaction term of these two variables, individual i × disability i , shows the difference in the claims-coverage relation between individual and group insurance.
10 We chose the specification of 0 months elimination period, i.e., no elimination period, as high coverage. The results presented below do not change when we define high coverage as 0 and 3 months elimination period. Table 5 provides an overview of the different coefficients necessary to interpret the interaction effect. The difference in chosen elimination period between contracts with a claim and without a claim in group insurance is measured by the coefficient β M H . If β M H > 0, a claim is associated with a higher coverage. As described earlier, in group insurance this is solely due to moral hazard. Selection is not possible in the group insurance. β M H thus measures the moral hazard effect. 
The table reports how our empirical model predicts the elimination period for group and individual insurance.
When looking at the difference in chosen elimination period between contracts with a claim and without a claim in individual insurance, one has to sum up the coefficients β M H and β AS .
An implicit assumption behind this argumentation is, that the moral hazard incentives of a difference in insurance coverage are the same in the group and the individual market. This is not necessarily always the case, as group pressure, peer monitoring and social ties have been shown to reduce ex ante moral hazard in group insurance (Biener et al., 2014) . However, it is difficult to imagine how these mechanisms could affect (presumably, mostly ex post) moral hazard in our specific situation. The coverage in the group insurance is also provided by an insurance company. The difference to individual insurance is, that this coverage is purchased by the employer and not the individual itself. Group pressure will thus not occur, especially as the disability claim of a single insured will not affect the premiums paid in the group contract.
Additionally, peer monitoring and social ties will most likely not affect disability claims, as the claimants no longer work when the claim is made because they are disabled. What remains is the incentive of higher coverage in case of disability, and this incentive is present in both individual and group insurance. We thus conclude that β M H measures moral hazard also in individual insurance. Therefore β AS , the difference to the group market, measures selection effects. β AS > 0 would mean that a claim is associated with a higher coverage in individual insurance that goes beyond the moral hazard effect measured by β M H . A positive sign of β AS would thus be evidence of adverse selection. On the contrary, β AS < 0 would mean that a claim is associated with a lower coverage. This would be evidence of advantageous selection. The table reports the results of the joint estimation of the elimination period in group and individual insurance. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The results of the two joint linear estimation described above are presented in Table 6 . The results look quite similar, whether we include control variables in addition to the ones used by the insurance company or not. The coefficient β M H is significantly larger than zero. As described above, this shows that moral hazard exists both in individual and in group insurance.
The more interesting coefficient is β AS . It is significantly smaller than zero. We can thus infer that advantageous selection exists in private individual long-term disability insurance. Still, the advantageous selection effect is not large enough to offset the moral hazard effect. The combined asymmetric information in individual insurance still has a positive sign, i.e., β M H + β AS > 0.
This explains why we found a positive correlation in aggregate for the individual market in Section 4.
The finding of moral hazard in disability insurance is not too surprising, and confirms the reslults of Autor et al. (2014) for the group market. However, the existence of advantageous selection in individual insurance deserves some discussion. We do not find evidence of adverse selection, which means that individuals apparently do not have more information about their specific risk type than the insurer. If there is an insurance market where this is the case, it is most likely private individual long-term disability insurance. Additional to several questions about employment, hobbies and lifestyle, the application form asks about the detailed medical and psychological history of the applicant, i.e., every doctor's visit, every hospital stay, in some cases back to 10 years. The insurer also has access to information about coverage with other insurers and rejections by other insurers. Due to this rich set of information, it is hardly probable that individuals could have information about their risk the insurer does not have. Furthermore, the average yearly disability probability in our dataset is only 0.17%. This makes it even harder for individuals to asses which risk they are.
In contrast, the finding of advantageous selection indeed makes sense. As discussed before, if risk averse individuals choose more coverage, it can easily be imagined that these risk averters are the better risk regarding a disability. It is probably less likely that risk averse individuals start a dangerous hobby, like skydiving or boxing, which would influence the probability of a disability.
Additionally, it has been shown that risk averters less often engage in health-damaging behavior like smoking or drinking (Barsky et al., 1997) . Naturally, this helps to prevent a disability.
As described above, there are two implicit assumptions behind our estimations 2 and 3:
Moral Hazard is the same in group and individual insurance, and there is no selection in the group insurance. We will now discuss them again in light of our results. As already noted, we assume that the moral hazard incentives of a difference in insurance coverage are the same in the group and the individual market. We argue that group pressure, peer monitoring or social ties will not affect the (presumably, mostly ex post) moral hazard in the group disability insurance in our dataset. However, if one does not want to maintain this assumption, our results would only underestimate the advantageous selection effect. The combined extent of asymmetric information in individual insurance is measured by β M H + β AS , with β M H as the moral hazard effect in group insurance. If moral hazard was larger in individual insurance than in group insurance, the advantageous selection effect would be even smaller, i.e., more negative, than
We furthermore argue that selection is not possible in group insurance, as the choice of coverage is up to the employer. However, Hanson (2005) argues that an employer might behave as an individual when purchasing insurance. In this case, the employer would purchase higher coverage if its' employees are of higher risk. 11 We argue that such behavior does not occur in our specific situation. For adverse selection on the group level, the employer would require more information about its' employees' risk of a disability than the insurer. It is hard to imagine how this could be the case in group disability insurance. The insurer has all the information about the medical and psychological history, which individuals usually do not share with their employer. However, if one does not follow this argumentation, our results would again only underestimate the advantageous selection effect. If adverse selection was present in the group insurance market, β M H would measure moral hazard and adverse selection in the group market.
And if adverse selection existed in the group market, the extent would certainly be smaller than in the individual market. But then, again, the advantageous selection effect in individual insurance would be even smaller, i.e., more negative, than β AS to yield the combined extent of asymmetric information in individual insurance we find.
An Illustrative Example for Advantageous Selection
In the previous section, we provided evidence that advantageous selection exists in individual long-term disability insurance. Now, we will identify one source where this advantageous selection originates from. For this purpose, we conduct the Unused Observables test (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2014) . The idea behind this is to analyze variables that are observed by the insurance company, but are not used for the pricing. If such a variable has a significant influence on both the demand for coverage and the realization of the risk, this is evidence of asymmetric information. Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) show that the residential location, and the socioeconomic characteristics associated with it, is such an unused observable in the annuity market. Information about the residential location of the insured person, i.e., the postal code, is also available in our dataset for most contracts. 12 We use the postal code to distinguish policyholders living in regions that were shown to differ with regard to their residents' risk aversion. This way, we can analyze advantageous selection in individual insurance, which is assumed to be caused by differences in risk aversion. The two different areas we attribute the policyholders to are East and West Germany. 13 Previous studies showed that people from West Germany are in general more risk averse (Bonin et al., 2009) , and in particular more risk averse with regard to health and to career (Bonin et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2011) , two issues that could be related with a disability.
12 We do not have information about the residential location for 4,786 contracts, which account for 1.7% of the contracts in individual insurance in our dataset. We therefore drop them in the estimations described in this chapter.
13 Additional to the contracts with no information about residential location, we also have 102 contracts, i.e. 0.04% of all contracts, with a residential location outside Germany. We also exclude these from the analyses in this chapter.
The Unused Observables test can be formalized and implemented as follows. Using the same notations as in the previous sections, we have two binary dependent variables. These are the claims disability i , i.e the realization of disability, and the coverage highcoverage i , i.e., the choice of the elimination period. Again, X i is the set of exogenous variables for individual i that is used by the insurance company to assess the individuals' risk of a disability. Furthermore, we add the unused observable west i . It is 1 if a person lives in West Germany, and zero if the residential location is in East Germany. This information is not used for the pricing, and is therefore not included in X i . We run the following probit estimations:
If we reject γ 1 = 0, γ 2 = 0, then asymmetric information is present. The signs of γ 1 and γ 2
give indication of the kind of asymmetric information that is present.
We first look at the effect of residential location on the realization of a disability, displayed in estimation (C) in Table 7 . In the interest of brevity, we do not report the coefficients of the variables in X i . The look sensible, e.g., positive coefficients of the medical and the hobby surcharge. With regard to the unused observable, there is a significant negative effect of a residential location in West Germany on the realization of a disability. One reason behind this could be the aforementioned higher risk aversion of West Germans, which could make them lower risks regarding a disability as described in Section 3. Table 7 show the effect of a residential location in West Germany on the choice of coverage. The two estimations differ only in the specification of highcoverage i , i.e., 0 months or 0 and 3 months. A residential location in West Germany has a significant positive effect on the demand for coverage. Again, one reason for this could be that more risk averse West Germans purchase higher insurance coverage.
Estimations (D) and (E) in
We can thus show that a residential location in West Germany (which is associated with a higher degree of risk aversion) has a negative effect on the likelihood of a disability, and a positive effect on the demand for coverage. This means, low-risk individuals purchase higher coverage, i.e., advantageous selection. Of course, residential location, whether due to differences in risk aversion or for other reasons, is probably not the only source of advantageous selection in disability insurance. However, it is a striking example that advantageous selection is present in disability insurance. 
Conclusion
The market for private long-term disability insurance is not as comprehensive as it probably should be considering the severe consequences of disability on lifetime income. This might be explained by market failures due to asymmetric information. Several studies have provided strong evidence of moral hazard in disability insurance to date. However, selection effects have not yet been analyzed in disability insurance. One reason why this analysis has not yet been conducted might be the difficulty of disentangling moral hazard from selection effects.
We use a unique dataset from a large German life insurer that includes both group and individual long-term disability insurance. This allows us to distinguish between moral hazard and selection by using group insurance as control group. Using the elimination period as a measure of coverage, we examine the correlation between this coverage and the risk, i.e., of a disability. This way, we can confirm the result of previous studies of moral hazard in group disability insurance. Furthermore we find evidence of moral hazard and advantageous selection in individual disability insurance. The individuals' residential location can be identified as one source of this advantageous selection.
We can thus conclude that adverse selection does not seem to be the reason for market failures in long-term disability insurance. Future research has to answer the question, if moral hazard is the only problem in the private long-term disability insurance market, or if other factors like crowding out of private insurance due to public coverage also play a role.
Nevertheless, there are several recommendations that can be drawn from our results. The first insight is that the underwriting in long-term disability insurance seems to be well-engineered enough to prevent adverse selection. Future endeavor of insurers to improve claim frequencies in long-term disability insurance should thus focus more on the reduction of moral hazard, which we showed is existent. The finding of advantageous selection might seem positive at a first glance, at least from the insurer's point of view. However, it is still inefficient, and thus not optimal from a social utilitarian perspective. To reduce this inefficiency, a potential regulator would have to focus on better intermediation quality in the disability insurance market. This could help to ensure that each individual gets exactly the amount of insurance coverage that is optimal.
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